In this paper, we develop a normative theory of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy based on the optimal trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance. First, in order to characterize this trade-o¤, we solve a dynamic moral hazard problem in which agents' private e¤ort decisions in ‡uence the life-cycle pro…les of their earnings. We then show how the optimal allocation of individual e¤ort and consumption can be implemented in a market equilibrium in which (i) agents and intermediaries repeatedly trade in secured and unsecured debt instruments, and (ii) agents obtain (restricted) discharge of their unsecured debts in bankruptcy. The structure of this equilibrium and the associated restrictions on debt discharge closely match the main qualitative features of personal credit markets and bankruptcy law that actually exist in the United States.
1 pro…les of their income. High e¤ort mitigates the income risk but cannot eliminate it completely.
In this environment, the (constrained) e¢ cient allocation of consumption and e¤ort recommends high e¤ort and does not provide full insurance against the income risk, as incentives for high e¤ort must be provided through a positive correlation between income and consumption. This correlation re ‡ects the optimal trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance.
In the second step, we demonstrate how this solution to the moral hazard problem can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium outcome in a market economy in which agents (consumers) repeatedly trade with free-entry …nancial intermediaries in a set of secured and unsecured debt instruments. Unsecured consumer debt is subject to discharge under speci…c rules of a personal bankruptcy law, which we characterize. Since this bankruptcy law implements the e¢ cient amount of income risk insurance, it e¢ ciently ful…lls the role assigned to the institution of bankruptcy.
The outcome of our normative analysis provides a theory of unsecured credit and personal bankruptcy. We proceed then by taking a …rst step toward confronting this theory with the data. In Section 7, we compare qualitatively the bankruptcy law and the structure of the unsecured credit markets that emerge in our model with the main features of the bankruptcy law and personal credit markets that actually exist in the United States. The basic structures of the two sets of institutions turn out to match closely.
First, the e¢ cient bankruptcy law of the model consists of (1) an income-tested bankruptcy eligibility condition; (2) a discharge provision, which frees the bankrupt agent from all unsecured debt obligations; and (3) a liquidation rule with an exemption provision. Liquidation means that the bankrupt agent's assets in excess of a given exemption level are seized from the agent and used to (at least partially) repay the creditors. The exemption provision sets the asset exemption level as well as frees all current and future labor income of the agent from any further creditors'claims. These three properties emerge endogenously as e¢ cient personal bankruptcy rules in our normative model.
In Section 7, we document that the same three properties characterize actual law that regulates personal bankruptcy in the United States. In particular, properties (1)-(3) are central features of the so-called U.S. chapter 7 personal bankruptcy procedure.
Second, the structure of the unsecured credit markets in our model is very similar to the structure of the unsecured credit markets in the U.S. economy. In the model, competitive intermediaries o¤er unsecured credit to the consumers in the form of loans characterized by an interest rate and a credit limit. In equilibrium, these interest rates and credit limits depend on consumers'observable characteristics that include income, debt, and assets. Intermediaries do have information about their prospective borrowers' unsecured debts outstanding with all other intermediaries, i.e., consumers cannot borrow anonymously. In Section 7, we document that all these features obtained in our normative model also characterize the actual structure of the unsecured consumer credit markets in the United States.
The hypothesis adopted in this paper is that (i) social insurance is provided through unsecured credit and bankruptcy discharge, and (ii) the trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives that arises from moral hazard is important for credit market and bankruptcy arrangements. Our theory of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy is built by deriving the implications of this 2 hypothesis under the requirement of e¢ ciency. The broad consistency of these implications with the observed institutions ought to be viewed as evidence validating our hypothesis.
Agents'private e¤ort is the sole friction in the primitives of the economic environment we study in this paper. Consistently, therefore, in the market economy implementing the optimal allocation, we assume that unobservable e¤ort is the only friction. In particular, full enforcement of private promises to repay debt is assumed to be available and, thus, consumers can borrow and lend at a risk-free rate. As well, we assume that all trades are publicly observable. Any relaxation of these assumptions would introduce an additional friction into the underlying economic environment, which would be inconsistent with our objective of isolating the implications of moral hazard for unsecured credit and personal bankruptcy.
In the life-cycle model we consider, there are only two possible realizations of agents'income in each period and the income shocks that agents experience are persistent. This formulation is suitable for studying the provision of insurance through personal bankruptcy. It is generally understood that insuring the frequent, small, and transitory shocks that households routinely experience over the life-cycle is not a role for the institution of personal bankruptcy. Such granular shocks are probably best insured through other means, or-possibly because of moral hazard-may have to go uninsured altogether. To re ‡ect this, we assume in our model a two-point support for the income in shock each period and interpret the …rst low income realization in the life-cycle as a shock su¢ ciently large to trigger bankruptcy. Our model with persistence admits a large class of low-frequency income processes, which makes our formulation both empirically plausible and suitable for studying optimal personal bankruptcy design.
Relation to the literature Methodologically, this paper is closely related to the Mirrleesian dynamic optimal taxation literature (e.g., Kocherlakota 2005 , Albanesi and Sleet 2006 , Golosov and Tsyvinski 2006 . We follow the same approach to the question of optimal design of the bankruptcy code as that literature uses with regard to the question of optimal design of the tax code. In this approach, following the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971) , optimal institutions emerge as mechanisms that implement optimal allocations derived directly from the primitives of preferences, technology, and information. Incomplete public information is a key friction shaping the optimal allocations and the institutions that attain them. 3 In our model, private information takes the form of the lack of public observability of e¤ort. Unlike most papers in the literature on dynamic moral hazard, our stochastic structure is not iid. 4 We consider a …nite-horizon, life-cycle model with a stochastic structure allowing for income persistence and age e¤ects. 5 The optimal allocation obtained in our model is recursive in an agent's continuation utility and, due to the persistence of income, the most recent realization of individual income.
At the technical level, our implementation with bankruptcy has features common with several tax implementations studied in the dynamic optimal taxation literature. Similar to the tax system of Albanesi and Sleet (2006) , which is recursive in wealth, our implementation with bankruptcy has a recursive structure. In our model, the state vector characterizing an agent consists of two variables: wealth and the most recent realization of individual income. Similar to the asset-tested disability insurance system of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) , the optimal bankruptcy rules of our model introduce a kink (a point of non-di¤erentiability) in the budget set faced by the agents. Most papers in the dynamic optimal taxation literature study implementations in which the government is the sole provider of social insurance. 6 In our implementation with bankruptcy, the role of the government is restricted to designing a bankruptcy law that allows agents to optimally self-insure by trading (repeatedly) with pro…t-maximizing private intermediaries.
Obviously, the implementation mechanism we propose is not unique in the environment we study. Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) , among others, provide examples of market-like implementations of solutions to optimal allocation problems with private information.
These examples can be easily adapted to our life-cycle environment with moral hazard. What differentiates our implementation is its similarity to the U.S. unsecured credit markets and personal bankruptcy laws. The realism of our implementation mechanism makes it useful for thinking about the connection between real-world personal bankruptcy regulations and e¢ cient solutions to normative optimal allocation problems with private information.
This paper is primarily related to the theoretical literature on default and personal bankruptcy.
Papers in this literature can be divided into three groups. First, there are papers that study default in economies with exogenously incomplete markets. Second, there are papers that study default and bankruptcy in economies with limited enforcement. In the third group are papers that, as we do herein, study default and bankruptcy in environments with private information. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) is a seminal paper in the literature on default (as opposed to bankruptcy) with exogenously incomplete markets. 7 That paper makes two important contributions. First, it extends the classic Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium to allow for defaultable assets and competitive asset pools. Second, it demonstrates that such assets and pools may improve e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome when asset markets are incomplete. In our paper, we use the competitive equilibrium construct of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) to model the unsecured consumer credit market. Unlike Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) , however, we do not assume an exogenously incomplete asset market structure. Rather, our model's asset market structure is endogenously incomplete, with a set of traded contracts emerging as a mechanism implementing the (constrained) optimal allocation under moral hazard. It is important to note that the fact that our model is built without exogenous contract-space restrictions allows us to characterize an optimal-not merely an e¢ ciency-improving-unsecured credit market structure 6 Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study the provision of social insurance by competitive insurance …rms and show that the competitive outcome may be ine¢ cient when agents have access to hidden re-trade markets. In this paper, we study optimal social insurance in an environment in which moral hazard is the only friction, i.e., all trades are observable and the results of Prescott and Townsend (1984) imply that the competitive outcome is e¢ cient.
7 Other contributions to this literature include Zame (1993) , Araujo and Pascoa (2002) . 4 and bankruptcy arrangement. Also, the abstract model of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) introduces default but does not explicitly de…ne an institution of personal bankruptcy, which makes this model di¢ cult to compare with the observed institutions. The unsecured credit markets and the bankruptcy code of our model, in contrast, have clear counterparts in the institutions observed in the U.S. economy.
The papers that study default and bankruptcy in environments with limited enforcement include Kehoe and Levine (1993 , 2001 , Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , among others. In this literature, enforcement of individual promises is restricted by the agents' ability to leave the economy and consume their individual endowment (i.e., their labor income). The loss of the ability to trade with others is the only penalty faced by the agents who leave. Most papers in this literature interpret leaving the economy as default. Under this interpretation, the possibility of default restricts feasible risk sharing, but default never actually occurs in equilibrium. Under this interpretation, thus, limited enforcement does not deliver a theory of default or bankruptcy.
In a recent paper, Kehoe and Levine (2006) abandon this interpretation of default in a limited enforcement environment. They demonstrate how the optimal allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium of an economy with defaultable assets in which default and bankruptcy do occur along the equilibrium path. This implementation mechanism is similar to the one we use in that the event of default/bankruptcy is identi…ed with the provision of an implicit insurance payment to agents hit by an adverse income shock. The optimal institution of bankruptcy obtained in Kehoe and Levine (2006) , however, di¤ers from the one that we obtain in our private information model. In their model, bankrupt agents are allowed to keep the returns on the loans they make to other agents but lose their holdings of all other assets. In our model, …nite but non-zero asset exemptions emerge as a key element of the optimal bankruptcy arrangement. Also, the structure of the unsecured credit markets we obtain in our model di¤ers signi…cantly from the mutual credit arrangement studied in Kehoe and Levine (2006) . The results we obtain in this paper suggest that moral hazard is an important force shaping the observed bankruptcy institutions. The results of Kehoe and Levine (2006) indicate that limited enforcement may be important as well.
The third strand of the theoretical literature on default and bankruptcy includes the papers that study environments with private information. Typically, papers in this literature study private information contracting problems in which agents' ability to declare bankruptcy is taken as an exogenous constraint on the set of feasible contracts (see, e.g., Bizer and DeMarzo 1999, Bisin and Rampini 2006) . In this paper, in contrast, bankruptcy is an element of a mechanism implementing the optimal allocation obtained in an environment in which private information is the sole friction.
In our model, thus, bankruptcy is an endogenous outcome rather than an exogenous constraint.
In a recent paper, Rampini (2005) studies an optimal risk sharing problem in a static private information environment and interprets the net transfers to agents hit by an adverse idiosyncratic income shock as default. That paper characterizes the size of the net transfers as a function of the realization of an aggregate income shock, which is observable. Net transfers are interpreted as default but actual borrowing and lending is left implicit. Rampini (2005) does not formally de…ne an institution of bankruptcy and does not consider the question of implementation of the optimal 5 allocation in a market economy with default/bankruptcy. In our paper, in contrast, we not only characterize the optimal allocation but also demonstrate how it can be implemented in a market economy with unsecured credit and bankruptcy. Also, we study a dynamic moral hazard environment with no aggregate risk, whereas Rampini (2005) studies a static hidden income environment with an aggregate shock.
Indirectly, this paper is also related to the quantitative literature on consumer credit, default and personal bankruptcy. 8 This literature builds on the theoretical foundation of the incomplete markets literature, in which, as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) , the role for default and bankruptcy stems from exogenous restrictions on the set of traded assets. The choice of these restrictions is important because the quantitative results obtained in this literature depend on the exact structure of these restrictions. 9 In our paper, analogous restrictions emerge endogenously as a mechanism implementing an optimal allocation. Therefore, the structure of the unsecured credit markets and the bankruptcy institution obtained in our model may be useful in guiding the choices of the credit market and bankruptcy structures studied in the quantitative literature. In particular,
in the concluding Section 8 we brie ‡y discuss two key features of the optimal market arrangement obtained in our model that have not been incorporated in the market arrangements studied in the quantitative literature.
Organization Section 2 lays out the environment and de…nes e¢ ciency. Section 3 provides a characterization of the optimal allocation. Section 4 lays out the market economy with unsecured credit and an institution of bankruptcy. It also formally de…nes and proves implementation, and provides a partial characterization of an optimal market arrangement and bankruptcy code. Section 5 provides further characterization by showing how optimal unsecured credit limits and asset exemption levels change with wealth. Section 6 isolates the e¤ect that moral hazard has on the structure of the optimal market arrangement and bankruptcy code of Section 4 by comparing it with a creditand-bankruptcy system that would be optimal in our environment had moral hazard been absent.
Section 7 discusses the similarities and dissimilarities between the optimal arrangement obtained in the model and the structure of unsecured consumer credit contracts, markets for consumer credit, and bankruptcy law currently functioning in the United States. Section 8 concludes.
Environment and e¢ ciency
The time horizon is …nite with T +1 periods indexed by t = 1; :::; T +1. There is a single consumption good in every period. The model economy is populated by a continuum of agents. All agents are ex ante identical with respect the their income-earning abilities and preferences over consumption and e¤ort.
Individual income, preferences, and information
Agents consume in all T + 1 periods. Consumption in period t is denoted by c t . Individual income of an agent in period t = 1; :::; T , denoted by y t , takes on values from the set t = f
H t for all t T: Agents earn no income in the …nal time period T +1, i.e., y T +1 0. Individual e¤ort in period t T , denoted by x t , takes on values from f0; 1g for t = 1; ::; T . There is no e¤ort in period T + 1.
The distribution of individual income in period t depends on the current e¤ort and the previous period's income level. The probability that individual income y t is realized at the value H t , conditional on e¤ort x t and income y t 1 , is denoted by t;yt 1 ( H t jx t ) for t T . 10 We assume that e¤ort is productive:
for any y t 1 . We allow for persistence in the income process:
for any x t . Note that t 6 = s for t 6 = s allows for life-cycle e¤ects.
Timing within a period is a follows. First, agents consume and expend e¤ort. Then individual income is realized. This means that consumption c t cannot be conditioned on contemporaneous income y t .
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Let y t = (y 1 ; :::; y t ) denote the partial history of realized income up to period t. The set of all income histories of length t is given by ::: t . 12 An individual consumption plan is c = (c 1 ; :::; c T +1 ), where c t :
Here, c t (y t 1 ) represents the consumption assigned in period t to an agent whose individual income history coming into period t is y t 1 . An individual e¤ort plan is x = (x 1 ; :::; x T ), where x t : t 1 ! f0; 1g represents the e¤ort recommended in period t to an agent whose individual income history is y t 1 .
Let E x denote the expectation operator over the paths y T 2 T conditional on an e¤ort plan x.
Agents'preferences over pairs (c; x) are represented by the expected utility function
where period utility functions U : R + ! R, U T +1 : R + ! R, and V t : f0; 1g ! R satisfy U 0 > 0,
T +1 < 0, and V t (1) < V t (0) for all t T . Throughout the paper, we assume that e¤ort is private information of the agents. All other variables are publicly observable. 1 0 Here, y 0 denotes the initial empty income history, the same for all agents. 1 1 This timing assumption is not essential. 1 2 Also, 0 will denote the initial empty history y 0 . 7
Allocations and e¢ ciency
Agents are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their initial promised utility !. Let denote the distribution of agents with respect to the promised utility value !, and let S( ) R denote the support of this distribution.
An allocation is an assignment of a pair (c; x) to each promised utility value ! in S( ). 13 We will denote an allocation by A = (c(!); x(!)) !2S( ) . Since e¤ort is private information of the agents, we restrict attention to incentive compatible allocations. 14 Allocation A is incentive compatible (IC) if
for all ! 2 S( ), where E is the set of all individual e¤ort strategies, i.e., the (…nite) set of all mappingsx t : t 1 ! f0; 1g for t T .
An IC allocation A = (c(!); x(!)) !2S( ) delivers the promised utility distribution if
Let fq t g T t=1 be an exogenous sequence of one-period discount rates at which resources can be transferred across time in this economy. 15 Given these prices, an IC allocation A = (c(!); x(!)) !2S( ) that delivers the promised utility distribution generates a net cost C A 1 ( ) given by
where y t (!) denotes the income process induced by the e¤ort assignment x(!), and 0 s=1 q s 1. Allocation A is e¢ cient if it is IC, if it delivers the initial distribution of promised utility , and if it minimizes, among all IC allocations that deliver , the net cost C A 1 ( ).
Recursive component planning problem
, and X t V 1 t for t T . For any t T and y t 1 2 t 1 , the component planning problem is to …nd the cost function B t;yt 1 : R ! R de…ned as follows:
Note that under an allocation, all agents with the same ! receive the same treatment. Such allocations are often called type-identical.
1 4 By the Revelation Principle, this is without loss of generality. 1 5 These outside markets do not have to be interpreted as international credit markets. They can be domestic markets in which the interest rate is determined by the marginal productivity of capital in the business sector. Production and capital accumulation processes are outside of the model, i.e., our economy represents the consumer sector for which the intertemporal resource prices are exogenous.
where minimization is subject to the temporary incentive compatibility (TIC) constraint
whereṽ = V t (1 X t (v)), and the promise keeping (PK) constraint
and where the function B t+1;yt solves the component planning problem at (t + 1; y t ). At (T + 1; y T ), the component planning problem is to …nd the cost function B T +1;y T : R ! R de…ned as follows:
where minimization is subject to the PK constraint
In these recursively de…ned minimization problems, B t;yt 1 (w t ) represents the minimum resource cost at t to provide continuation utility w t to an agent whose previous period's income is y t 1 . For any t T , y t 1 2 t 1 and any number w t , let u t;yt 1 (w t ), v t;yt 1 (w t ), and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) denote policies that attain B t;yt 1 (w t ). Also, let u T +1;y T (w T +1 ) denote a policy that attains B T +1;y T (w T +1 ).
An initial distribution of promised utility and policies f(v t;yt 1 ; u t;yt 1 ; w t+1;yt 1 ) t=1:::T yt 12 t 1 ; u T +1;y T g de…ne an allocation A = (c(!); x(!)) !2S( ) as follows. Let w = (w 1 ; :::; w T +1 ), where w t : R t 1 ! R, be an optimal continuation utility process de…ned as a solution to the di¤erence equations w t+1 = w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) with the initial value w 1 = !. 
Properties of the optimum
To avoid dealing with trivial cases, we assume that high e¤ort is e¢ cient at all dates and states.
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Assumption 1 The parameters of the environment are such that high e¤ ort is e¢ cient at all dates and states, i.e.,
for all t T and y t 1 2 t 1 .
Given the ‡exibility of the speci…cation of preferences, technology and the support of the initial distribution , it is clear that such parameters actually exist. Note that this assumption implies that v t;yt 1 (w t (!; y t 1 )) = V t (1) for all ! 2 S( ), t T , and y t 1 2 t 1 . We maintain Assumption 1 throughout.
The following lemma establishes, as a consequence of Assumption 1, some properties of the solutions to the component planning problems.
Lemma 1 For any t T + 1, y t 1 2 t 1 , the cost functions B t;yt 1 are strictly increasing, strictly convex, and di¤ erentiable with
For any t T , y t 1 2 t 1 and w t , the solution to the component planning problem has the following properties:
Also, the component planner policy functions u t;yt 1 (w t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ), y t 2 t , are strictly increasing in w t .
Proof In Appendix.
Inequality (7) follows from the persistence of income. Intuitively, when income is persistent, delivering a given amount of utility w t to an agent whose past income is high is less costly than delivering the same w t to an agent whose past income is low. Properties (8)- (12) are standard in dynamic moral hazard models. In particular, inequality (8) means that agents continuation value increases with realized income. This property follows from the need to reward high e¤ort. If it did not hold, high e¤ort would not be incentive compatible for the agents. Inequality (9) means that the component planner provides a net payment to the low-income agents and receives a net payment from the high income agents. If this were not true, the high e¤ort recommendation would not be optimal for the planner.
We now demonstrate two important properties of the optimum.
Proposition 1 At the optimum A , all agents are 1. insurance-constrained:
for any ! 2 S( ), t T , and y t 1 2 t 1 ; and 2. savings-constrained:
for any ! 2 S( ), t T , and y t 1 2 t 1 .
Proof Inequalities (13) and (14) follow from the two inequalities in (11) after substituting from (10), (6), and using the inverse function theorem. Inequality (15) follows from (12), (10), (6), the inverse function theorem, and the Jensen inequality.
Inequalities (13) and (14) mean that the optimal amount of insurance provided to the agents is less-than-full. At the optimal allocation, if an agent had an opportunity to take out insurance against the consumption risk remaining in the optimal consumption allocation, she would be willing to pay more than the fair-odds premium for it.
Inequality (15) means that the optimal amount of intertemporal consumption-smoothing provided to the agents is less-than-full. At the optimal allocation, if an agent had an opportunity to borrow or save, she would be willing to save at a gross rate of interest smaller than 1=q t , i.e., pay a premium relative to the intertemporal cost of resources q t .
Ine¢ ciency of the riskless claims equilibrium and advantages of unsecured lending
As a point of departure we take a result of Atkeson and Lucas (1992) , which demonstrates that the standard riskless claims market equilibrium is incapable of the implementation of the private information optimum. Consider, in the context of our environment, a market mechanism consisting simply a set of riskless claims markets. 18 With free entry into the riskless borrowing and lending, the presence of the outside markets for riskless claims with prices fq t g T t=1 implies (by arbitrage) that the equilibrium claims prices must be identically equal to fq t g T t=1 . An equilibrium allocation of consumption under such a set of markets, denoted byĉ, must satisfy the standard Euler equation
Therefore,ĉ cannot coincide with c , as c satis…es the strict inequality (15), which can be rewritten
This, as pointed out in Atkeson and Lucas (1992) , means that a simple set of riskless claims markets does not implement the private-information optimum.
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Intuitively, two factors contribute to the riskless claims markets' failure to implement the optimum. First, riskless claims' payo¤s are uncontingent, i.e., they are not contingent on individual agents' income realizations. Thus, riskless claims markets do not allow the agents to su¢ ciently insure their individual income risk. Second, riskless claims markets provide unrestricted access to self-insurance via savings. In the presence of the …rst failure, agents over-self-insure (i.e., over-save)
in the riskless claims equilibrium.
How can these two failures be avoided with unsecured lending? Suppose that the riskless claims markets are supplemented with unsecured debt, and that agents can discharge their unsecured debt obligations if their individual income realizations are low. Such an expanded set of markets, clearly, can provide better insurance against individual-speci…c income shocks. For an equilibrium of such a set of markets to be consistent with the optimal allocation c at which agents are insurance-and savings-constrained, mechanisms must exist to discourage over-insurance and over-saving.
In the market arrangement that we formally de…ne in the next subsection, competitive intermediaries extend unsecured credit to the agents. Dischargeability of unsecured credit is regulated by rules akin to bankruptcy law. Under these rules, only low-income agents are eligible to receive discharge of their unsecured loans. The discharged loans have to be written o¤ by the intermediaries as losses. This makes for an implicit transfer from the intermediaries to the low-income agents.
High-income agents, however, by design of the bankruptcy rules, are ineligible for discharge. They must repay the unsecured obligations with interest. Interest paid by the borrowers whose loans are not discharged is the intermediaries' pro…t, i.e., it makes for a transfer from the high-income agents to the intermediaries. The equilibrium interest rate on the unsecured loans (the default premium) is determined at the level at which the intermediaries break even (make zero pro…t). Thus, this pattern of unsecured borrowing and income-contingent discharge implements a transfer from the high-income agents to the low-income agents, i.e., provides insurance payments contingent on individual income realizations.
In order for the intermediaries to break even, the probability of default on the unsecured loans has to be priced correctly. This probability, however, depends on the agents'e¤ort, which is private information and, thus, cannot be written into the unsecured loan contract. The intermediaries can break even and provide inexpensive unsecured credit (which maximizes the agents' welfare) only if the amount of unsecured credit available to each agent is restricted su¢ ciently to avoid giving the agent an incentive to over-insure and expend low e¤ort. Thus, in equilibrium each agent can obtain unsecured credit only up to a limit. This limit is determined at the maximum level consistent with the agent's expending high e¤ort. Under this limit, agents remain insurance-constrained in equilibrium, as they are at the optimal allocation c .
The second failure of the riskless claims equilibrium (over-self-insurance) is resolved by designing the bankruptcy law in such a way that the bene…t of unsecured credit discharge is tied to not oversaving. Agents can freely save, i.e., they can accumulate wealth by buying riskless claims in any quantity they want and can a¤ord. Excessive amounts of wealth, however, cannot be retained by agents who seek discharge of their unsecured debt obligations in bankruptcy. This, e¤ectively, makes dischargeability of the nominally unsecured debt conditional on the debtor's wealth in a way that reduces the bene…t of the bankruptcy option for over-savers. Agents are free to save, but they value the option of discharge. This mechanism, which is absent when only the riskless claims are traded, discourages over-saving. What exactly constitutes over-saving follows from the optimal amount of "savings" implicit in the optimal allocation c .
Unsecured credit markets and bankruptcy discharge conditions
In this subsection, we lay out a market economy with unsecured credit and a formal institution of bankruptcy. The timing of interaction is as follows.
Market interaction in periods t T
The sequence of events within each period t T is divided into three stages.
Stage 1 Agents enter period t with bonds b t . Intermediaries o¤er unsecured credit to the agents.
Agents make three decisions. They decide how much unsecured credit to take out with the intermediaries, and how to split the resources available to them between current consumption and savings, which they take into the second stage of interaction. Let h t 0 denote the amount of unsecured credit taken out. Resources b t + h t are split between consumption c t and savings s t . The third decision agents take in stage 1 is their e¤ort decision x t 2 f0; 1g.
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Unsecured credit is available to the agents as a loan o¤er extended by the intermediaries. This loan is short-term: it matures within the period, at stage 2, after agents produce period income y t .
The amount h t of the unsecured loan that each agent takes out is publicly observable 20 . A loan consists of an interest rate and a credit limit. The terms of the loan depend on the agent's observable characteristics. The gross interest rate in period t, denoted by R t;yt 1 (b t ), depends on last-period's income y t 1 and wealth b t . Similarly, the unsecured credit limit in period t, denoted by h t;yt 1 (b t ), depends on agent's y t 1 and b t . At the end of stage 1, an agent initially characterized by wealth b t and past income data y t 1 holds assets s t = b t + h t c t , owes h t R t;yt 1 (b t ) to the intermediaries, and has expended privately e¤ort x t 2 f0; 1g. Note that each agent simultaneously holds assets, s t , and has liabilities, h t R t;yt 1 . Hence, assets s t are leveraged by debt h t R t;yt 1 (in contrast to beginning-of-period wealth b t ).
Stage 2 In the second stage within the period, individual income y t is realized and the unsecured loans h t are due repayment. At this stage, each agent chooses how to settle their unsecured debt obligation. There are, potentially, two options: to pay back, or to default and seek discharge in bankruptcy. Let d t 2 f0; 1g be the indicator of the decision to default in period t.
What happens after default is regulated by a bankruptcy law, which is speci…ed as follows.
First, there is a discharge eligibility condition f t , which speci…es that only low-income agents are eligible for discharge of debt in bankruptcy. 21 By this condition, the repayment of high-income agents'unsecured loans will be enforced. 22 Those with the low income realization y t = L t meet the eligibility condition f t . If they choose to not default, which is denoted by d t = 0, they repay the loan h t with interest (just like the high-income agents do), i.e., they pay h t R t;yt 1 to the intermediaries.
If they choose to default, which is denoted by d t = 1, the settlement of their obligations is handled (by a bankruptcy court) according to the rules speci…ed in the bankruptcy law. These rules are as follows.
1. The unsecured debt obligations of the bankrupt agent, h t R t;yt 1 , are discharged.
2. All current and future income of the bankrupt agent is out of reach of the unsecured creditors (i.e., is exempt).
3. The assets held by the bankrupt agent, s t , are exempt as well, up to a maximum s t;y 1 (b t ).
Any assets in excess of the exemption level s t;y 1 (b t ) are seized from the bankrupt agent and used to (at least partially) repay the unsecured creditors.
Under these rules, the discharged loans have to be written o¤ by the intermediaries as losses.
Creditors exit stage 2 with income from the repaid loans and losses on the loans that were discharged.
(In equilibrium, these pro…ts and losses will add up to zero). Agents who did not obtain discharge exit stage 2 with their current income y t and their savings s t minus the amount h t R t;yt 1 , which they must repay to the creditors. Those who obtained discharge exit stage 2 with their current income y t and their exempt assets given by the smaller of s t and s t;y 1 , and with no unsecured debt obligations.
Stage 3 At the third stage and …nal stage, agents use their post-settlement resources to purchase claims b t+1 , which will be their wealth entering period t + 1.
Market interaction in period T + 1
In the …nal period T + 1, the sequence of events is much simpler. Agents enter with wealth b T +1 .
There is no e¤ort decision or income risk in this period. Claims b T +1 pay o¤ and agents consume.
Individual optimization problems
Bankruptcy Code formalism In the model, the discharge eligibility condition is represented by the functions f t : t ! f0; 1g. The bankruptcy asset exemption level is formally represented by the functions s t;yt 1 : R ! R. In this notation, f t (y t ) is the bankruptcy eligibility indicator for an agent whose income in period t is y t . The value s t;yt 1 (b t ) represents the exemption level, i.e., the amount of assets s t that an agent can shield from his creditors in bankruptcy. Note that the exemption level depends on beginning-of-period wealth b t , as well as on income from the previous period, y t 1 . 23 We will refer to s t;yt 1 (b t ) as the exemption level for type (y t 1 ; b t ).
Agents' problem Agents take as given the riskless bond prices fq t g T t=1 , the unsecured loans pricing and credit limit schedules f R t;yt 1 ; h t;yt 1 yt 12 t 1 g T t=1 , and the rules of bankruptcy ff t ; s t;yt 1 yt 12 t 1 g T t=1 . Given an initial wealth b 1 , an agent solves the following recursive maximization problem:
subject to the budget constraints
for t T ; with
In the above problem, d(y t ) is the indicator of the agent's decision to go bankrupt in income state 
Importantly, agents cannot conceal income y t or wealth b t or s t . This assumption is consistent with the moral hazard environment we study in this paper, in which agents' e¤ort is the only piece of private information, and all other variables and parameters of the environment are publicly observable.
For any t T and y t 1 2 t 1 and wealth b t , we will denote the agents' individually optimal policies for e¤ort, consumption, unsecured borrowing, intra-period savings, default, and next period wealth, i.e., the policies that attain the utility value W t;yt 1 (b t ) by, respectively, x t;yt 1 (b t ),
. Also, by c T +1;y T (b T +1 ) we will denote the consumption policy that attains W T +1;y T (b T +1 ).
Unsecured lenders'problem Following Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), we model unsecured credit markets as perfectly competitive. In this model, lenders take the terms of the unsecured loan contacts as given. An unsecured loan o¤er extended to an agent whose last period's income is y t 1 and whose wealth is b t will be referred to as loans of type (y t 1 ; b t ). The lenders take as given the following characteristics of an unsecured loan of type (y t 1 ; b t ): the gross interest rate R t;yt 1 (b t ), the credit limit h t;yt 1 (b t ), the expected loan demand h e t;yt 1 (b t ), the expected default rate D e t;yt 1 (b t ), and the expected principal recovery rate e t;yt 1 (b t ) on the loans in default. The expected pro…t on a loan of type (y t 1 ; b t ) is given by
In equilibrium, lenders'expectations are correct and thus the (ex ante) expected pro…t equals the actually realized (ex post) pro…t on a fully diversi…ed portfolio of unsecured loans of type (y t 1 ; b t ).
We assume that intermediaries diversify, i.e., each lender holds a portfolio of loans made out to a non-zero mass of consumers of type (y t 1 ; b t ). Investing in a fully diversi…ed portfolio of loans of a type (y t 1 ; b t ) is a constant returns to scale activity. With constant returns to scale, free entry into unsecured lending implies that equilibrium pro…ts must be zero. Since in equilibrium the intermediaries make zero pro…ts on each type of loan in every period, the number of intermediaries operating in equilibrium is indeterminate. It is important to note that the credit limit h t;yt 1 (b t )
applies to the total amount of unsecured credit that an agent of type (y t 1 ; b t ) can take out with the whole unsecured lending industry. Here, as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) , we assume here that the intermediaries can take the enforcement of this credit limit as a given.
In our formulation of the lenders'problem, the lenders take the terms of the unsecured loan contracts as given, i.e., market-determined. We do not model explicitly the process in which these terms are derived. It is worth pointing out, however, that our results do not depend on the assumption of perfect competition in unsecured lending. Khan and Mookherjee (1995) study a strategic contracting game in which …nancial intermediaries o¤er (non-exclusive) insurance contracts to an agent whose income is subject to risk in ‡uenced by his private e¤ort. They show that the (constraint) optimal allocation emerges as an equilibrium outcome of this interaction. This result can be easily adapted to the moral hazard environment with observable trades that we study in this paper. 24 Therefore, our implementation of the optimal allocation in a set of competitive unsecured credit markets and bankruptcy does not depend on the assumption of perfect competition in unsecured lending.
Equilibrium
De…nition 1 Given an initial distribution of wealth , the riskless bond prices fq t g T t=1 , and the rules of bankruptcy (f; s) = ff t ; s t;yt 1 yt 12 t 1 g T t=1 ; recursive competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy consists of the consumers' value functions W t;yt 1 and individual policiesx t;yt 1 ,ĥ t;yt 1 , c t;yt 1 ,ŝ t;yt 1 ,d t;yt 1 ,b t+1;yt 1 , one for every t T and y t 1 2 t 1 , the value functions W T +1;y T and policiesĉ T +1;y T for y T 2 T , interest rates and credit limits f R t;yt 1 ; h t;yt 1 yt 12 t 1 g 
for all t; y t 1 ; b t .
Let E(f; s; ) denote the set of objects that constitute a recursive equilibrium under the bankruptcy rules (f; s) and the initial wealth distribution . An equilibrium allocation is an assignment of an individual consumption plan c and an individual e¤ort plan x to each initial wealth value
Implementation
We now formally de…ne implementation. Our de…nition is similar to the one used in Albanesi and Sleet (2006) . Recall from Section 2 that A ( ) = (c (!); x (!)) !2S( ) denotes an e¢ cient allocation that attains the minimum cost of provision of the initial distribution of promised utility , C 1 ( ).
Let : R ! R be a measurable function assigning initial wealth to each initial promised utility !, i.e., for all ! 2 S( ) we have (!) = . For a given distribution of promised utility , induces a distribution of wealth that we will denote by ( ).
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De…nition 2 We say that a bankruptcy code (f; s) and an initial wealth assignment function implement an e¢ cient allocation A ( ) if there exists a recursive competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy E(f; s; ( )) such that the equilibrium allocationÂ( ( )) coincides with the optimal allocation A ( ), i.e., for all ! 2 S( )x
Note that the conditions (21) and (22) imply that
i.e., the amount of resources used by the equilibrium allocationÂ( ( )) is equal to the minimum C 1 ( ).
2 5 To clarify the notation, b t+1 is generic notation for wealth at the beginning of period t + 1,b t+1;y t 1 (bt; yt) is an optimal policy function in the consumer utility maximization problem, andb t+1 (!; y t ) is the value of the equilibrium wealth process generated from the initial wealth and the sequential application of policy functionsb t+1;y t 1 (bt; yt) along the history y t . 2 6 By de…nition, for any measurable set of wealth levels S, ( )(S) = ( 1 (S)).
Theorem 1 There exists a bankruptcy code (f; s) and a wealth assignment that implement the e¢ cient allocation A ( ) under any distribution of initial utility . In particular, implementation is attained by the code (f; s) and the function given as follows. The code (f; s) is given by
for t T , and
for t T and y t 1 2 t 1 , where B t+1;yt is the component planning cost function at (t; y t 1 ), and w t+1;yt 1 is the continuation utility policy function from this component planning problem. The wealth assignment function is given by
The optimal bankruptcy eligibility condition (23) states simply that only low-income agents are eligible for bankruptcy discharge. The optimal asset exemption level, given in (24), is determined by the solutions to the component planning problems. 27 As in the implementation of Albanesi and Sleet (2006) , the optimal wealth assignment function endows each agent of type ! with initial wealth b 1 = B 1;y0 (!), i.e., with initial resources equal to the minimum cost of the component planner at date t = 1 to deliver promised utility !.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove this theorem using backward induction. The …rst step is the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For both y T 2 T ,
Moreover, the equilibrium individual policyĉ T +1;y T satis…eŝ
The inductive step is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix t T and y t 1 2 t 1 . Under bankruptcy rules (f t ; s t;yt 1 ) given in (23) for all t = 1; :::; T + 1 and y t 1 2 t 1 . Note now that applying Proposition 2 at t = 1, we have that equilibrium allocationÂ( ( )) satis…eŝ
and that the equilibrium wealth processb satis…esb 1 = (!) and, for any y 1 2 1 , b 2 ( (!); y 1 ) =b 2;y0 (b 1 ; y 1 ) = B 2;y1 (w 2;y0 ( 1 (b 1 ); y 1 )) = B 2;y1 (w 2 (!; y 1 )) for all ! 2 S( ), where the last line follows from de…nition of the continuation utility process w. Similarly, applying Proposition 2 repeatedly at dates t = 2; :::; T we get that the equilibrium allocation coincides with the optimum
at these dates, and the equilibrium wealth processb coincides with the component planner cost functions evaluated at the continuation value process w , i.e., for any ! 2 S( ), t T and y t 2 t b t+1 ( (!); y t ) =b t+1;yt 1 (b t ( (!); y t 1 ); y t ) = B t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (B 1 t;yt 1 (b t ( (!); y t 1 )); y t )) = B t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t (!; y t 1 ); y t )) = B t+1;yt 1 (w t+1 (!; y t )):
In particular, at t = T , we havê
for all ! 2 S( ) and y T 2 T . Lemma 2 implies now that
for all ! 2 S( ) and y T 2 T . Thus, allocationsÂ( ( )) and A ( ) coincide.
It order to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we need to prove Proposition 2, which provides the key argument of our implementation result.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is constructive. We specify a set of prices, credit limits, expected credit usage, default, and recovery rates for unsecured loans, as well as consumer borrowing, saving, e¤ort, consumption and default policies and verify that these objects are consistent with equilibrium under the assumed consumers'continuation value functions W t+1;yt given in (26).
For a loan type (y t 1 ; b t ), the gross interest rate is given by
and the credit limit is
The expected credit usage, default, and recovery rates are given by, respectively,
The proposed equilibrium consumer policies are as follows: e¤ortx t;yt 1 as in (27), consumption c t;yt 1 as in (28), the unsecured borrowing and saving policies given by, respectively,
for any b t . The consumer default policy given bŷ
and claims purchasesb t+1;yt 1 (b t ; y t ) as given in (29).
We need to show that the proposed equilibrium loan terms and consumer policies, and expectations are consistent with the three equilibrium conditions of De…nition 1.
We start with the expectation consistency conditions. Substituting the proposed equilibrium consumers'policies, we directly obtain, for any b t , h e t;yt 1 (b t ) = C(u t;yt 1 (B 1 t;y 1 (b t ))) + s t;yt 1 (b t ) b t =ĉ t;yt 1 (b t ) + s t;yt 1 (b t ) b t =ĥ t;yt 1 (b t );
and
which means that the loan demand and default rate expectations are consistent with the proposed equilibrium agent behavior. Also, under the exemption rule s t;yt 1 given in (24), the amount of assets seized in equilibrium in bankruptcy from debtors of type y t 1 ; b t is max ŝ t;yt 1 (b t ) s t;yt 1 (b t ); 0 = max s t;yt 1 (b t ) s t;yt 1 (b t ); 0 = 0; which means that the recovery rate expectation e t;yt 1 (b t ) = 0 is consistent with agents'equilibrium behavior, as well.
Checking the zero-pro…t condition for loans of type (y t 1 ; b t ), we get e yt 1;bt
What remains to be shown is that the proposed agents' behavior policies are consistent with agents' utility maximization under the continuation value functions (26), unsecured debt pricing schedules (30) and bankruptcy rules (f t ; s t ) given in (23)-(24).
We …rst demonstrate that the proposed behavior is budget-feasible. Straightforward substitution of the proposed equilibrium policies to the budget constraints (16)-(20) shows this directly, except for the requirementĥ t;yt 1 (b t ) 0. Under the proposed equilibrium behavior, we havê
for any b t . That the expression on the right-hand side of this equality is positive follows from the fact that, at the solution to the component planning problem, a positive amount of resources is delivered to the low-income agents in period t. To see this, note that since (by de…nition) C(u t;yt 1 (w t )) + X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1)f y t + q t B t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ))g B t;yt 1 (w t ) = 0; (32) inequality (9) implies
for all w t , i.e.,ĥ t;yt 1 0.
We must show that the proposed choices, in addition to being budget-feasible, are in fact optimal in the utility maximization problem, i.e., that there does not exist a budget feasible plan that yields more utility than the proposed equilibrium policies. The standard argument for showing that would examine the …rst-order conditions (FOC) of this problem. The maximization problem at hand, however, has a non-convex budget set. We handle the non-convexity in the following way:
we divide the budget set into several subsets, each of which is given by linear inequalities. The problem of overall utility maximization is split into the several problems of maximization over the convex subsets. In each of these subsets, we use the standard FOC-based argument. The proposed equilibrium behavior dominates the solutions to each of the sub-problems, and thus it is an overall solution to the utility maximization problem.
We start out by examining the set of default plans available to the agents. Under the eligibility rule (23) the choice d( H t ) = 1 is not budget-feasible. Thus, there are only two budget-feasible default plans for agents of all wealth levels b t :
The default premium, i.e., the fact that
, if an agent plans to never default, borrowing in the unsecured instrument is suboptimal. To see this, note that under the no-default plan (33), the budget constraints (16)- (20) reduce to
for y t 2 t . Given that agents'continuation value W t+1;yt is strictly increasing in b 0 (y t ), any choice of c, s, h and b 0 (y t ), such that h > 0 is strictly dominated by the feasible choicec = c,s = s h,
for y t 2 t . We thus have that, under the proposed equilibrium pricing, the best allocation that agents can individually obtain using the no-default plan (33) coincides with the best allocation they obtain under self-insurance. Given that self-insurance is ine¢ cient in the environment at hand, the proposed equilibrium allocation dominates any individual plan that does not involve default in the low income state. Thus, no such plan can deliver higher individual utility than that delivered at the optimum.
We now consider deviations from the proposed equilibrium behavior under the other feasible default plan (34). We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 At any t T , for any b t and y t 1 2 t 1 , under the proposed equilibrium prices, credit limits and bankruptcy rules, conditional on the default plan (34) and high e¤ ort x t = 1, the proposed equilibrium policiesĉ t;yt 1 ;ĥ t;yt 1 ;ŝ t;yt 1 ;b t+1;yt 1 solve the consumer utility maximization problem.
The next lemma shows that the same conclusion is true under low e¤ort x t = 0.
Lemma 4 At any t T , for any b t and y t 1 2 t 1 , under the proposed equilibrium prices, credit limits and bankruptcy rules, conditional on the default plan (34) and low e¤ ort x t = 0, the proposed equilibrium policiesĉ t;yt 1 ;ĥ t;yt 1 ;ŝ t;yt 1 ;b t+1;yt 1 solve the consumer utility maximization problem.
By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have that agents …nd it optimal to follow the same policieŝ c t;yt 1 ;ĥ t;yt 1 ;ŝ t;yt 1 ;b t+1;yt 1 under either e¤ort choice x t 2 f0; 1g, whereĉ t;yt 1 satis…es (28) and b t+1;yt 1 satis…es (29). Thus, the value W t;yt 1 (b t ) of the utility maximization problem is given by
From (26) and (29), we have that W t+1;yt (b t+1;yt (b t ; y t )) = w t+1;yt 1 (B 1 t;yt 1 (b t ); y t ). From (28) and the de…nition of C, we have U (ĉ t;yt 1 (b t )) = u t;yt 1 (B 1 t;yt 1 (b t )). Substituting into (36), we have
where the last line follows from the fact that the recommendation v t;yt 1 (w t ) = V t (1) is an optimal policy in the component planning problem, i.e., the recommendation v t;yt 1 and the continuation utility policy w t+1;yt 1 satisfy the TIC constraint (4) of this problem. Finally, that W t;yt 1 (b t ) = B 1 t;yt 1 (b t ) for every b t follows from (37) and the fact that the solution to the component planning problem, v t;yt 1 (w t ) = V t (1), u t;yt 1 (w t ), w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ), satis…es the PK constraint (5) of this problem for every w t .
A key step in the proof of this implementation result is checking that the socially optimal allocation A is consistent with agents'individual utility maximization in the market economy. The optimal allocation is determined by the solutions to component planning problems, in which the planner directly controls everything but agent's private e¤ort. By Proposition 1, at the socially optimal allocation agents are insurance-and savings-constrained. In our market economy, agents have much freedom in choosing their insurance and savings levels through their trades in the riskless claims markets, their unsecured borrowing, and bankruptcy decisions. Why do the agents not …nd it individually optimal to trade away from the socially optimal allocation? First, consider the insurance wedge given in (13) and (14). In the market economy with unsecured credit and bankruptcy, agents'access to insurance is restricted by the unsecured credit limit h t;yt 1 and the bankruptcy asset exemption level s t;yt 1 . Inequality (13) implies that agents would like to deviate from the optimal allocation by selling contingent claims to their income in the high state y t = H t . The credit limit h t;yt 1 makes such a sale infeasible, i.e., outside the budget set faced by the agents the market economy. Inequality (14) implies that agents would like to trade away from the optimal allocation by buying a claim that would pay o¤ in their low income state y t = L t . Conditional on an agent's plan to obtain bankruptcy discharge in the low income state, however, this trade is not in the budget set, either. Saving more than the asset exemption level s t;yt 1 and going into bankruptcy in the low income state does not increase the agent's post-settlement resources in this state because savings in excess of the exemption level s t;yt 1 are seized from the agent. 28 The same mechanisms makes the savings wedge (15) consistent with agents'individual optimization in the market economy. The optimal bankruptcy rules provide a disincentive to save via the exemption cap s t;yt 1 . Note that agents do have the option to not subject themselves to the savings restriction s t;yt 1 by never going into bankruptcy. This plan of action, however, is suboptimal, as it eliminates the bene…t of insurance that bankruptcy provides to the agents.
As Lemma 4 demonstrates, the unsecured credit limit h t;yt 1 and the bankruptcy asset exemption level s t;yt 1 not only discourage deviations from the optimum in asset market trades but also the so-called joint deviations in which agents simultaneously adjust their asset market trades and private e¤ort. In fact, an agent's deviation to low e¤ort x t = 0 increases his demand for insurance against the low income shock y t = L t . It is thus intuitive that if the credit limit h t;yt 1 and the exemption cap s t;yt 1 prevent a deviation in asset trades under high e¤ort, the more so they do under low e¤ort.
History dependence through wealth
In this section, we examine how the optimal exemption level s t;yt 1 (b t ) and the unsecured credit limit h t;yt 1 (b t ) depend on wealth b t .
Proposition 3 For any t T and y t 1 2 t 1 , the optimal exemption level s t;yt 1 (b t ) is strictly increasing in wealth b t at a rate strictly smaller that one. The equilibrium unsecured credit limit h t;yt 1 (b t ) is strictly decreasing in b t .
Proof The optimal exemption level is de…ned in (24) as
Since B t;yt 1 is strictly increasing, so is B 1 t;yt 1 . By Lemma 1, w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ) is strictly increasing in w t . Thus, since B t+1; L t is strictly increasing, we have that
Using (24), the expression for the equilibrium credit limit (31) can be rewritten as follows
From (32), we have
That h t;yt 1 (b t ) is strictly decreasing follows now from the fact that B 1 t;yt 1 is strictly increasing, (44) and (11).
To show that the rate at which s t;yt 1 (b t ) increases in b t is strictly less than one, we write (31) as h t;yt 1 (b t ) C(u t;yt 1 (B 1 t;y 1 (b t ))) = s t;yt 1 (b t ) b t for all b t . Since C(u t;yt 1 (B 1 t;y 1 (b t ))) is increasing in b t , the left-hand side of this identity is strictly decreasing in b t . So must be the right-hand side.
The dependence of the optimal exemption level and equilibrium credit limit on wealth follows from the underlying incentive problem quite intuitively. The exception level s t;yt 1 (b t ) restricts, and in equilibrium determines, the amount of wealth that an agent of type (y t 1 ; b t ) can take into 26 period t + 1 following the low income realization y t = L t . Since it is e¢ cient in the component planning problem to intertemporally smooth the provision of the continuation value to the agent, the optimal continuation value process is persistent. In the market economy, wealth b t tracts each agent's continuation value. Thus, wealth must be persistent in equilibrium, i.e., for each realization of current income y t , wealth taken into period t + 1 is increasing with wealth held at the beginning of period t . In particular, it is increasing for y t = L t , and thus s t;yt 1 (b t ) must be increasing in b t . That h t;yt 1 (b t ) is strictly decreasing in wealth b t follows from the decreasing marginal utility of wealth and the need to provide an incentive to exert e¤ort. High e¤ort at date t carries the same disutility V t (1) V t (0) for agents of all wealth levels b t . Because agents'value functions are strictly concave, richer agents have lower marginal utility of wealth. For richer agents, therefore, it takes more spreading in the equilibrium wealth process to provide a given amount of spreading in their continuation value process. Thus, in order to provide enough incentives for the agents to choose to incur the high e¤ort disutility V t (1) V t (0), less insurance against the individual income shock in period t is optimally provided to agents with higher wealth b t . In equilibrium, agents obtain insurance through unsecured borrowing and discharge. Thus, the amount of unsecured credit available to richer agents is decreasing with wealth b t .
Isolating the e¤ects of moral hazard
In this section, we isolate those features of the optimal bankruptcy code and the unsecured credit arrangement that are due to moral hazard. To this end, we consider a full-information version of our environment. The e¢ cient allocation of the full-information environment, similar to the optimum of the moral hazard environment, can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome of an unsecured credit market economy with debt discharge regulated by a bankruptcy code. In particular, the fullinformation optimum can be implemented in a market arrangement in which agents face no unsecured credit limit, and bankruptcy provides unlimited asset exemption to all bankruptcy-eligible agents.
The associated eligibility condition, however, is more stringent, as eligibility is determined on the basis of both income and e¤ort.
E¢ ciency with full information
Under full information, an allocation A = (c(!); x(!)) !2 is e¢ cient if it delivers the initial distribution of promised utility , and if it minimizes, among all allocations that deliver , the net cost C A 1 ( ) given in (3). Note that the incentive compatibility requirement is absent from this de…nition. Let A ( ) = (c (!); x (!)) !2 denote the full-information optimum, and let C 1 (!) denote the !-component of the minimized cost objective. It is a standard result that A satis…es the following optimality condition Uborrowing-constrained. (Compare this with Proposition 1 in the moral hazard case.) As before, we will assume that high e¤ort is optimal at all dates and states.
Unsecured credit market implementation
Consider now the market economy de…ned in Section 4.2, in which agents trade secured (riskless) bonds and take out unsecured loans with competitive …nancial intermediaries. In this economy, let us specify the bankruptcy rules (f; s) as follows. Let the eligibility condition f t be given by
t and x t = 1; 0 otherwise (38) for t T . Note that e¤ort x t , which now is publicly observable, is an argument of f t . Also, set the asset exemption level s t;yt 1 (b t ) equal to plus in…nity for all t, y t 1 and b t (i.e., eliminate the possibility of seizure of assets). Under these bankruptcy rules, the unsecured debts of all lowincome, high-e¤ort agents are dischargeable, and all assets held by a bankrupt agent, in addition to his current and future income, are exempt from creditors'claims.
Following the steps of the proof of Theorem 1, it is straightforward to verify that these bankruptcy rules constitute an optimal bankruptcy code in the full-information economy. In particular, under the above bankruptcy rules and with the initial assignment of wealth = C 1 , an equilibrium exists in which the unsecured credit limit h t:yt 1 (b t ) is plus in…nity for all all t, y t 1 and b t , and the gross interest rate on the unsecured loans available to the consumers is given by, as in (30),
In equilibrium, the size of the unsecured loan h taken out by an agent who faces the rate R t;yt 1 isĥ t;yt 1 = ( H t L t )=R t;yt 1 , independently of wealth b t . The discharge eligibility condition (38) is su¢ cient to induce high e¤ort. If an agent decides to exert low e¤ort, it is optimal for him to borrow h = 0 because he will not be able to discharge h and R t;yt 1 > 1. With low e¤ort, thus, the best an agent can do is to self-insure. This strategy, however, is dominated by the equilibrium strategy, because self-insurance is ine¢ cient.
Comparing moral hazard and full information
Unsecured credit markets and bankruptcy can be used to implement optimal social insurance in a full information economy as well as in the economy with moral hazard. The results of the last subsection demonstrate that unsecured credit limits and bounded bankruptcy asset exemptions are inessential under full information. Both of these are essential, however, in the moral hazard economy, as follows from our proof of Theorem 1. Also, it is easy to show that conditioning on e¤ort is essential in implementation of the full-information optimum A . Theorem 1 shows that such conditioning is not needed in market implementation of the constrained optimum A under moral hazard. In our model, therefore, moral hazard necessitates credit limits and bankruptcy asset exemption caps. This result suggests that moral hazard may explain why credit limits and bankruptcy exemption caps are observed in real-life unsecured consumer credit markets and bankruptcy arrangements.
Discussion of positive properties
In this paper, we use an abstract, stylized environment to study normative implications of dynamic moral hazard for the structure of unsecured credit markets and personal bankruptcy. Thus, we develop a normative, e¢ ciency-based theory of unsecured consumer credit and bankruptcy. It must be emphasized that our model was not designed to replicate any particular set of facts about the structure of actual credit markets or bankruptcy laws functioning in any given country. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the outcome of our normative analysis from a positive perspective. The objective of this section is to discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between the normative prescriptions of the model and the data in order to explore both the limitations of the model and the possibilities for identifying potential ine¢ ciencies in the design of the observed institutions.
In the …rst subsection, we compare the basic structure of the credit market and bankruptcy arrangement obtained in our normative model with the basic structure of the institutions currently functioning in the United States. We conclude that these structures are remarkably similar. We take this similarity as evidence in support of the main hypothesis of this paper: the institution of personal bankruptcy is an insurance mechanism (against the risk of idiosyncratic income loss) and moral hazard is an important force shaping this institution.
In the second subsection, we look beyond the basic structure of the model. Several of the additional qualitative features of the model highlight dimensions on which our analysis could be extended as well as suggest directions that can be taken in thinking about potential policy improvements.
Basic structure
The structure of the unsecured credit market obtained in our model has the following four basic characteristics:
1. Default and bankruptcy discharge of unsecured debt occur in equilibrium.
2. Consumers borrow unsecurely at high interest rates and, simultaneously, hold low-yielding liquid assets, which could be used to reduce or eliminate their unsecured debt. Consumers face limits on the amount of unsecured credit they can obtain.
3. Lenders have information about all unsecured loans that their borrowers obtain from other lenders. Lenders write o¤ loans discharged in bankruptcy as losses.
4. The unsecured lending sector is competitive.
These four properties are well documented in the U.S. data. At a general level, they are broadly consistent with the stylized facts provided in Chatterjee et al. (2007) . More particularly, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) and Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2000) present data on the prevalence of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy in the United States. The fact that a large number of credit card borrowers hold liquid assets in signi…cant quantities is sometimes referred to as the credit card puzzle. This fact is documented in, e.g., Gross and Souleles (2001) . 29 Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Hunt (2003) The optimal bankruptcy rules obtained in our model have the following three basic properties:
1. Bankruptcy discharges unsecured debt obligations.
2. Bankruptcy rules provide limited asset exemptions for debtors obtaining discharge. In addition to the exempt assets, all current and future individual income is exempt.
3. Eligibility for bankruptcy debt discharge is means-tested on the basis of current income.
These three properties make the bankruptcy institution derived in our model strikingly similar to the liquidation procedure of the U.S. bankruptcy law, i.e., the so-called chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in fact discharges all unsecured debt obligations, provides asset exemptions for debtors, and frees all current and future income of the debtor from claims of the creditors.
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Means-testing for debtor eligibility to obtain discharge in chapter 7 bankruptcy was introduced by which is de…ned as income less allowable expenses), the debtor is eligible for discharge on grounds of being unable to repay his unsecured debt. Clearly, this feature of the BAPCPA test may provide an above-median income household with an incentive to increase borrowing in order to qualify for chapter 7 discharge.
Additional implications
Beyond the basic structure, a number of additional features of our model can be confronted with the corresponding features of the market arrangement in the U.S. economy. In the model, seizure of non-exempt assets is an o¤-equilibrium event, i.e., the recovery rate on loans in bankruptcy is zero. Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2000) cite evidence showing that gross (96 percent in a large sample) of chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are the so-called no-asset cases, in which debtors do not hold any non-exempt assets. Consequently, conditional on bankruptcy, lenders'recovery rates are close to zero. By Proposition 3, the level of the asset exemption provided by the optimal bankruptcy rule of our model is strictly increasing in the agent's wealth. As a fraction of wealth, however, the exemption is decreasing. In the model, therefore, the exemption is regressive (i.e., increasing at a decreasing rate).
It is not immediately clear how the asset exemption provided by the U.S. chapter 7 bankruptcy law depends on the level of debtor's wealth. Chapter 7 bankruptcy provides not one but many exemptions, one for each of the several asset classes distinguished in the law. 32 The total wealth exemption, therefore, will depend on how a debtor's wealth is allocated among these di¤erent asset classes. Within each asset class, the exemption is given by a simple ceiling level speci…ed in absolute terms. 33 The overall exemption level, however, can increase in debtors'total wealth. This increase will be observed if wealthier debtors'wealth is spread among a larger number of asset classes recognized by the law. Thus, the fact that the within-class exemption caps are absolute is not inconsistent with the overall exemption level being increasing in debtors'wealth.
It is clear, however, that the observed structure of bounded within-class chapter 7 asset exemptions makes the overall exemption level a regressive function of wealth. For debtors with higher overall wealth, within-class exemptions granted in the U.S. chapter 7 procedure will bind within a larger number of asset classes. Eventually, the within-class exemptions will be exhausted, which makes the overall exemption level regressive, as it is in our model (see Proposition 3). In the model, however, the exemption level is smoother than the one provided by chapter 7. Also, even at very high levels of wealth, the exemption level of our model is slightly increasing. This means that wealthy agents in our model receive more insurance than what chapter 7 appears to be providing to wealthy households in the United States.
Closely related to the asset exemption level is the unsecured credit limit faced by an agent. In our model, as shown in Proposition 3, the unsecured credit limit h t;yt 1 is decreasing in individual wealth. It is important to point out, however, that it would be incorrect to identify the credit limit h t;yt 1 with the nominally unsecured credit limit of a household in the data (measured by the sum of limits on credit card accounts and other unsecured loans held by the household). In the model, agents borrow unsecurely purely for insurance purposes and do not hold any non-exempt wealth in equilibrium. Thus, 100% of the unsecured credit extended to the agents in our model is dischargeable in personal bankruptcy. If we de…ne de facto unsecured credit as precisely what can be discharged in bankruptcy, all of the unsecured credit used in our model is de facto unsecured.
In reality, households hold non-exempt assets and use unsecured credit not exclusively for insurance purposes. Non-exempt wealth held by a household in the U.S. implicitly collateralizes the nominally unsecured credit available to the household. 34 Therefore, credit card limits and the unsecured credit limit of our model are two di¤erent objects.
The amount of de facto unsecured credit available to a household in the United States, which would be comparable with our limit h t;yt 1 , is hard to measure directly. This amount depends on the overall wealth exemption level facing the household in the chapter 7 procedure, which in turn depends on the allocation of wealth among the various asset classes distinguished in the law.
It is clear, however, that the bounded within-class asset exemptions of chapter 7 constitute a mechanism that decreases the de facto unsecured credit limit available to a household whose wealth increases. In fact, as wealth of a debtor increases, so does the non-exempt portion of it, as the allowed exemptions are not unbounded. The non-exempt wealth reduces dollar-for-dollar the de facto unsecured portion of a given nominally unsecured credit limit faced by the debtor. 35 A similar mechanism functions in our model.
In this paper, all kinds of real and …nancial wealth held by households are represented by a single, abstract riskless bond. Our model, therefore, is not suitable to address the interesting question of why di¤erent asset classes receive di¤erent exemption levels in the U.S. bankruptcy law. In the normative exercise we perform, individual income shocks are the only risk that agents face over the life-cycle, and unsecured borrowing and bankruptcy are, by construction, the only means for the agents to obtain insurance against these shocks. This modeling approach, commonly used in the normative literature (including the literature on optimal taxation), puts limits on how realistic the model prescriptions can be. Given these obvious limitations, it should be rather surprising how well the outcome of our normative analysis corresponds to the actual institutions observed in the U.S.
economy.
Both in the data and in the model, the level of bankruptcy asset exemption provided to households is regressive in household wealth (i.e., is increasing at a decreasing rate). It appears, however, that the exemption provided in the U.S. chapter 7 law is too regressive relative to the prescriptions of our model. In e¤ect, the insurance opportunities that chapter 7 procedure provides to wealthy households appear to be less than what theoretically could be provided through this channel if the exemption level schedule were chosen to be less regressive.
Conclusions
In this paper, we pose and answer the normative question of how unsecured credit markets and the institution of personal bankruptcy should be organized in order to implement an e¢ cient allocation of e¤ort and consumption in a stylized life-cycle moral hazard economy. In equilibrium, agents borrow unsecurely and, simultaneously, save in the riskless asset. If hit by an adverse idiosyncratic income shock, agents use personal bankruptcy to obtain discharge of their unsecured debt obligations. In bankruptcy, agents use the asset exemption allowed by the optimal bankruptcy rules to shield their savings from the creditors. In e¤ect, they obtain insurance against the adverse income shock. The optimal bankruptcy rules are designed to ensure incentive compatibility of this insurance mechanism.
Eligibility for discharge is means-tested and asset exemptions are bounded. Access to unsecured credit, as well, is limited. The unsecured credit limits are tight just enough to not give agents an incentive to shirk. Unsecured credit is priced at actuarially fair odds and lenders break even in equilibrium.
Viewed from a positive perspective, our model formalizes the notion that unsecured credit and personal bankruptcy constitute a mechanism for the provision of social insurance under asymmetric information. In our analysis, from this notion we derive an e¢ ciency-based theory on how unsecured credit markets and personal bankruptcy should be organized. The institutions obtained in our analysis turn out to be qualitatively similar to those actually observed in the United States. Our study, therefore, supports the notion that bankruptcy is an insurance mechanism whose functioning is constrained by private information.
Agents'unobservable e¤ort is the only friction in the otherwise frictionless environment we study.
This assumption allows us to isolate the implications of moral hazard for unsecured lending and personal bankruptcy. By confronting these implications with the main features of the institutions functioning in the U.S. economy, we gain insight into what other frictions, in addition to moral hazard, may be important in shaping the observed institutions. In particular, given the important role collateral plays in actual bankruptcy laws, the availability of costless enforcement of private contracts stands out as a strong assumption in our analysis. It seems that examining the implications of private information jointly with costly contract enforcement may provide further insights into the functioning of consumer credit markets and optimal design of the institution of bankruptcy.
Beyond these general lessons, our results can be useful for quantitative studies of personal bankruptcy in the United States. An essential feature of the optimal arrangement of our model is that unsecured debt is distinct from negative wealth. Also, our model demonstrates that bankruptcy asset exemptions are important in determining what portion of nominally unsecured credit is de facto unsecured, i.e., dischargeable in bankruptcy. These features of our model suggest that disentangling unsecured credit from negative net worth and accounting for asset exemptions may be a productive next step to take in quantitative work.
policy that would generate a lower cost than the optimum (by the strict concavity of B t+1;yt ), a contradiction.
Since the TIC binds, it must hold with equality, i.e.,
t;yt 1 (y t j1)w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) = V t (0) + X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j0)w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ):
Directly from this equality we have that the recommendation of low e¤ort x = 0 satis…es the TIC in the minimization problem de…ning B t;yt 1 (w t ). Under this recommendation, the promise keeping (PK) constraint (5) is satis…ed as well, as either side of the above TIC constraint equals w t u t;yt 1 (w t ). Thus, the recommendation of low e¤ort x = 0, the consumption utility assignment u t;yt 1 (w t ) and the continuation utility assignment w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) for y t 2 t are a feasible choice for the component planner in the minimization problem de…ning B t;yt 1 (w t ). We now use this fact to show inequality (9).
If (9) is violated, (1) implies that the low e¤ort recommendation x = 0, the consumption utility assignment u t;yt 1 (w t ), and the continuation utility assignment w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) for y t 2 t is a policy choice that achieves a cost strictly lower than B t;yt 1 (w t ) as B t;yt 1 (w t ) = C(u t;yt 1 (w t )) + X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1)f y t + q t B t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ))g > C(u t;yt 1 (w t )) + X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j0)f y t + q t B t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ))g:
This contradicts Assumption 1. Thus, inequality (9) holds.
To show inequality (7), note that the valueũ de…ned as u = u t; L t 1 (w t ) w t+1; L B t;yt 1 (w t ") for some w t and " 6 = 0, with " small in absolute value. Because the policies u t;yt 1 (w t ") + " and w t+1;yt 1 (w t "; y t ) for y t 2 t are feasible in the minimization problem de…ning B t;yt 1 (w t ), we get B t;yt 1 (w t ) B t;yt 1 (w t ") C(u t;yt 1 (w t ") + ") C(u t;yt 1 (w t ")):
Also, since the policies u t;yt 1 (w t ) " and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ) for y t 2 t are feasible in the minimization problem de…ning B t;yt 1 (w t "), we get B t;yt 1 (w t ) B t;yt 1 (w t ") C(u t;yt 1 (w t )) C(u t;yt 1 (w t ) "):
Dividing by ", we get C(u t;yt 1 (w t )) C(u t;yt 1 (w t ) ") " B t;yt 1 (w t ) B t;yt 1 (w t ") " C(u t;yt 1 (w t ") + ") C(u t;yt 1 (w t ")) " :
Taking the (left and right) limit as " ! 0, we get that B 0 t;yt 1 (w t ) exists with B 0 t;yt 1 (w t ) = C 0 (u t;yt 1 (w t )):
We can now further characterize the cost functions B t;yt 1 by using the …rst-order and envelope conditions. For every (t; y t 1 ) 2 f1; :::; T g t 1 and w t , the …rst-order conditions are as follows C 0 (u t;yt 1 (w t )) = t;yt 1;wt ;
B 0 t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t ))q t 1 = t;yt 1;wt (1 LR t;yt 1 (y t )) + t;yt 1;wt ;
for y t 2 t , where t;yt 1;wt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the TIC constraint, t;yt 1;wt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the PK constraint, and LR t;yt 1 (y t ) is the likelihood ratio, given by LR t;yt 1 (y t ) = t;yt 1 (y t j0) t;yt 1 (y t j1)
:
The envelope condition is B 0 t;yt 1 (w t ) = t;yt 1;wt :
Conditional on y t 1 , the expectation of the likelihood ratio, under optimal e¤ort x t;yt 1 (w t ) = 1 is one: X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1)LR t;yt 1 (y t ) = X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1) t;yt 1 (y t j0) t;yt 1 (y t j1)
Since e¤ort is productive, i.e., (1), we thus have
for any y t 1 2 t 1 .
Condition (10) follows directly from (39) and (41). Inequalities (11) follow from (40) with (41) and the inequalities (43). Condition (12) follows by adding up equations (40) over y t 2 t and using (42).
We now show that the policy functions are strictly increasing in the utility value delivered.
Writing the binding TIC constraint as follows 
we get that w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; H t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ) are co-monotone in w t , as the changes in w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; H t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ) associated with any change in w t must be exactly equal to each other. From (12) and (10), we have C 0 (u t;yt 1 (w t )) = q t 1 X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1)B 0 t+1;yt (w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; y t )):
Since B 0 t+1;yt is increasing for both y t 2 t ; the right-hand side of this equation is co-monotone with the continuation values w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; H t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ). Thus, so must be the left-hand side. By concavity of C, we get that u t;yt 1 (w t ), as well, is co-monotone with the continuation values w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; H t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ). Thus, as w t varies, u t;yt 1 (w t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; H t ) and w t+1;yt 1 (w t ; L t ) all change in the same direction. The promise-keeping constraint (5) implies that these three values must be increasing in w t with at least one value strictly increasing. That all three are strictly increasing follows from (45) and (44).
Proof of Lemma 2
Solving for W T +1;y T from de…nition, for any b T +1 , we get
with optimal consumptionĉ
Similarly, from de…nitions of B T +1;y T and C T +1 we have for any w T +1
B T +1;y T (w) = min
= U 1 T +1 (w T +1 ); with u T +1;y T (w T +1 ) = w T +1 :
Thus, where the …rst equality follows from (48), the second from (47), and the third from (46).
Proof of Lemma 3
Under the assumptions of the lemma, the problem of a consumer of type (y t 1 ; b t ) reduces to max c;h;s;b 0 (y t ) V t (1) + U (c) + X yt2 t t;yt 1 (y t j1)W t+1;yt (b 0 (y t ))
subject to the budget constraints 0 h h t;yt 1 (b t ); show that z e solves both of the two auxiliary maximization problems. Indeed, if there exists in a vectorz that dominates z e (with respect to the objective (49)), then z e cannot solve both of the two auxiliary problems, asz must be feasible in at least one of them.
Since the objective is strict concavity and the constraint set is convex, it is su¢ cient to show that z e satis…es the FOCs in each of the two auxiliary problems. In the …rst sub-problem, they are (ignoring the non-negativity constraint on h):
with equality if h < h t;yt 1 (b t ) and
